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Tax Credits on Federally Created
Exchanges: Lessons from a Legislative
Process Failure Theory of Statutory
Interpretation
Mark Seidenfeld†
Opponents to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (ACA or Act) have mounted yet another seemingly
formidable challenge to basic provisions of the Act, focusing on
whether the Act authorizes insurance premium tax credits for
individuals who obtain insurance on an American Health
Benefit Exchange (Exchange) established by the federal
government. The argument against construing the Act to allow
such tax subsidies depends largely on applying technical tools
of statutory interpretation, usually associated with the Textual
school of interpretation, to various provisions of the Act to
discern that the best objective reading authorizes premium tax
credits only to individuals who purchase insurance on
Exchanges established by the state in which the Exchange
operates.
This issue has the potential to destabilize the operation of
the ACA in the 36 states that did not set up their own
Exchanges.1 The Affordable Care Act has been described as a
three legged stool that can stand only by imposing obligations
on insurers and individuals, while providing subsidies to make

† Patricia A. Dore Professor of Administrative Law, Florida State
University College of Law. I owe great thanks to the stupendous and quick
research assistance of Aaron Retteen and Sarah Logan Beasley. I would also
like to thank Jonathan Adler, Steve Johnson, and Marshall Kapp for
comments that helped me improve this Essay. Copyright © 2015 by Mark
Seidenfeld.
1. Thirty-six states had not established their own exchanges as of
November 7, 2014, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the
issue addressed by this Essay. See Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear New
Challenge to Health Law, NY TIMES (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/11/08/us/politics/supreme-court-to-hear-new-challenge-to-healthlaw.html?_r=0.
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insurance more affordable.2 Eliminating any one of these three
legs would undermine the operation of insurance markets and
thereby doom the ACA to failure.3 In addition, the ACA
imposes an obligation on large employers,4 which is crucial to
maintain current broad based coverage of those who are
employed as well as to reduce the net government cost of
keeping insurance affordable.5 The Act burdens insurers to
provide insurance without regard to health related conditions
of the insured.6 Individuals with preexisting conditions cannot
be denied insurance; in addition, insurance premiums can only
take two health related factors into account: age and whether
the individual smoked tobacco, and the ACA limits even the
extent to which these factors can affect rates.7 Insurers can
only meet this burden at an affordable price if young, healthy
individuals, who do not generate anywhere near the level of
claims that older and infirm individuals do, can be induced to
purchases insurance at rates above the expected cost of their
claims, essentially providing a cross-subsidy of insurance for
the elderly and frail.8
The ACA provides a premium tax credit to any individual
whose household income is between 100% and 400% of the
poverty level, and who purchases insurance on an Exchange.9
2. Jonathan Gruber, Health Care Reform Is a “Three-Legged Stool” The
Costs of Partially Repealing the Affordable Care Act, 1-2 (CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, Aug. 2010), available at http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp
-content/uploads/issues/2010/08/pdf/repealing_reform.pdf
(“Critics who
propose to ‘repeal and replace’ the Affordable Care Act don't seem to
understand that all three legs of the stool are critical for reform. Pulling out
any of the legs while leaving one or two intact will critically undercut gains
from reform.”).
3. Id.
4. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2014).
5. See Riley Lovendale, Note, Tax vs. Penalty, Round Two: Interpreting
the ACA’s Assessable Payment As a Tax for Federal Award Cost Allowances, 55
B.C. L. REV. 947, 977 (2014) (claiming that the ACA’s employer mandate was
meant “explicitly to strengthen the private employer-provided health
insurance market in order to achieve its goal of near-universal health
coverage”); see also Katherine Pratt, Funding Health Care with an Employer
Mandate: Efficiency and Equity Concerns, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 155, 156–57
(1994) (discussing an employer mandate as a means for the federal
government to “fund” health care cost increases well before consideration of
the ACA).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2014).
7. Id. (further noting that rates can vary based on whether the plan is
for an individual or family and the geographical area).
8. Gruber, supra note 2, at 2–3.
9. 26 U.S.C. § 36B (adding § 36B to the Internal Revenue Code).
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Without this subsidy, many individuals would simply not be
able to afford to purchase health insurance.10 Even if an
individual could afford insurance, she may choose not to
purchase it if she perceives the benefit she will derive from it as
less than its cost. Hence, premium tax credits increase the
attractiveness of insurance to those who do not envision
incurring significant health care costs.11 The ACA further
encourages individual purchase of insurance by requiring
individuals to pay a penalty if they fail to purchase insurance.12
But, individuals who would have to pay more than eight
percent of their income to purchase the cheapest plan on their
relevant Exchange are exempt from this penalty.13 Without the
premium tax credit, the cost of insurance for many individuals
would exceed the eight percent trigger for the exemption,
relieving them of their obligation to obtain insurance.14 In
short, without premium subsidies, millions of young and
healthy Americans would not face penalties for failure to
purchase insurance and many others would simply pay the
penalties and not purchase it.
The ability of financially qualified individuals to obtain
premium subsidies also affects employers’ incentives to offer
insurance to their workers under the Act. The ACA did not
mean to alter the fundamental method by which the vast
majority of individuals in the United States obtain health
insurance – from their employers. But the incentives for
10. See Brendan S. Mahar & Radha A. Pathak, Enough About the
Constitution: How States Can Regulate Insurance Under the ACA, 31 YALE L.
& POL’Y REV. 275, 294 (2013) (“The ACA addresses the affordability [of health
insurance] through use of subsidies for those at low-income levels.”); Amy B.
Monahan, On Subsidies and Mandates: A Regulatory Critique of ACA, 36 J.
CORP. L. 781, 783 (2011) (“In order to make coverage more affordable,
individuals with household income below 400% FPL are eligible for refundable
tax credits that subsidize insurance purchase.”).
11. See David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax
Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are Needed to Prevent
Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669,
685 (2012) (noting that tax credits are carrots to encourage those who
otherwise would not purchase insurance to do so).
12. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1).
13. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)(A). The eight percent figure is calculated
based on the individual’s “required contribution,” which is essentially the
individual’s cost of insurance net of any premium tax credit. 26 U.S.C. §
5000A(e)(1)(B).
14. See Amy B. Monahan, Fairness Versus Welfare in Health Insurance
Content Regulation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 139, 144 (2012) (discussing the
relationship of the ACA’s premium subsidies to its individual mandate to
purchase insurance).
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employers to provide insurance as an employee benefit
decreases if workers can obtain affordable insurance on the
Exchanges. For this reason, the ACA subjects large employers
– those with 50 or more full time workers or the equivalent – to
monetary penalties for failing to provide adequate insurance to
their full time employees.15 But, the penalty provision is
triggered only if an employee who is eligible to purchase
insurance on an Exchange does so, and receives a subsidy
under the Act.16 Essentially, in states that have not establish
their own Exchanges, limiting entitlement to tax credits
removes any teeth from the sanction against large employers
who flout the employer “mandate.”
It is no exaggeration to surmise that the economic viability
of the ACA in the 36 states that have not created their own
exchanges depends on the availability of subsidies to
individuals who purchase insurance on federally created state
Exchanges. Thus, the lack of availability of tax credits on
federally created Exchanges would seriously undermine the
most fundamental goal of the Act – universal health care
coverage – and potentially entirely destabilize the market for
individual insurance in those states. And the failure of the
ACA in those states could seriously threaten to damn it
politically in the 14 states that set up their own exchanges.
This Essay advocates that the question of whether
individuals who purchase insurance on federally created
exchanges are eligible for tax credits should be interpreted
using a recently proposed method of reading statutes – the
“legislative process failure theory of statutory interpretation.”17
Under this theory, courts should not rely on traditional judicial
methods of interpreting statutory provisions, especially
technical application of Textualist tools of interpretation, when
15. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H.
16. The ACA imposes penalties on a large employer if any of its employees
purchase insurance on an Exchange and qualify for premium tax credits or
reduced cost sharing. Id. Unlike the section governing premium tax credits,
the section providing for cost sharing reductions does not expressly limit those
subsidies to the Exchange established by the state. 42 U.S.C. § 18071. But,
cost sharing subsidies are available only during coverage months, 42 U.S.C. §
18071(f)(2), and the reduced cost sharing provisions use the definition of
coverage month specified in the section governing premium tax credits, 42
U.S.C. § 18071(f)(1). That definition refers explicitly to the Exchange
established by the state under section 1311. See 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(a).
17. This theory is set out in detail and defended in Mark Seidenfeld, A
Process Failure Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
467 (2014).
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those methods lead to a “best meaning” that likely was not the
meaning that most legislators ascribed to the provision. In
such instances, courts should pay more attention to contextual
clues to legislators’ likely understanding of the statutory
provision, including legislative history. With respect to tax
credits for purchasers on federally created exchanges, this
Essay concludes that the fact that virtually no one seemed to be
aware, when the ACA was passed, that it could be read to
preclude such subsidies strongly supports reading the statute
to authorize them.
I. PREMIUM TAX CREDITS UNDER THE AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT
A. THE TEXT OF THE PREMIUM SUBSIDY PROVISIONS OF THE
ACA
There are three provisions of the ACA that directly relate
to the question of whether individuals who enroll in insurance
plans via federally created Exchanges may receive subsidies.
First, Section 1311, which specifies requirements that
Exchanges must meet under the Act, provides that “Each state
shall . . . establish an American Health Benefit Exchange
(referred to in this title as an ‘Exchange’).”18 Second, if a state
fails to do so, Section 1321 requires the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to establish and operate “such Exchange” in
that state, and requires federally run Exchanges to meet the
requirements Section 1311 imposes on state-established
Exchanges.19
Third, Section 1401 provides for premium
assistance tax credits for taxpayers with incomes between
100% and 400% of the poverty level.20 The potential
interpretive problem arises because of the interrelationship
between tax credits and the Exchanges required by Section
1311. The amount of the tax credit depends on the monthly
premiums the taxpayer pays for qualified health plans
“enrolled in through an Exchange established by the State
under 1311.”21

18. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (2012). Section 1562 of the Act, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 300gg-91(d)(21) (2012), defines “Exchange” as “an American Health
Benefit Exchange established under section 18031 of this title.”
19. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2012).
20. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(1) (2012).
21. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012).
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The IRS has issued regulations interpreting the ACA to
authorize premium subsidies for individuals who obtain
insurance on federally created Exchanges.22 Because the ACA’s
provisions regarding the amount of credits to which an
individual is entitled refers to plans “which were enrolled in
through an Exchange established by the State under 1311,”23
some opponents of the Act, most notably and comprehensively
Jonathan Adler and Michael Cannon, have argued that
subsidies are not authorized for taxpayers who enrolled in
plans purchased on Exchanges established by the federal
government under Section 1321.24
The Fourth Circuit,
considering a petition for review asserting that the regulations
exceeded the IRS’s authority, recently affirmed the IRS
interpretation.25 On the same day, however, a panel of the DC
Circuit reversed the IRS interpretation.26 Subsequently, the
entire DC Circuit vacated its panel’s decision, and scheduled
the case for hearing en banc.27 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme
Court granted cert to hear the issue.28
At first blush, the language of the ACA suggests that
federally created Exchanges are included in the term
“American Health Benefit Exchange” as used in Section 1311.
The key language is the provision in Section 1321 that if a state
fails to establish a qualified Exchange, the federal government
is responsible to set up “such Exchange,”29 along with the
provision in Section 1311 that “Exchange” refers to those
required to be established by states.30 The most natural
reading of these two fairly straightforward provisions, suggests
that a federally run Exchange in a state substitutes in all

22. See Health Insurance Premium Tax Credit, 77 Fed. Reg. 30377, 30378
(May 23, 2012) (explaining why the IRS interpreted the ACA to authorize
premium tax credits on federally facilitated Exchanges).
23. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A).
24. See generally Jonathan H. Adler & Michael F. Cannon, Taxation
Without Representation: The Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits under the
PPACA, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 119 (2013).
25. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 375–76 (4th Cir. 2014) cert. granted,
135 S. Ct. 475 (2014).
26. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 412 (D.C. Cir. 2014) reh’g en banc
granted, judgment vacated, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4,
2014).
27. Halbig v. Burwell, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181, at *1.
28. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 475 (Nov. 7, 2014).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c)(1) (2012).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (2012).
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respects for a qualified Exchange established by the state.31
This reading is also most consistent with the overall structure
of the Act, and there is no provision of the Act that directly
demands a different reading.32
If, however, one applies a technical reading of the Act,
characteristic of the approach that Textualists use,33 that
initial impression becomes less certain. Section 1401 of the Act
provides that the total annual credit to which a taxpayer is
entitled is the sum of the credits for each “coverage month,”
which means: “any month if— (i) as of the first day of such
month the taxpayer . . . is covered by a qualified health plan . . .
that was enrolled in through an Exchange established by the
State under section 1311 . . . .”34 The one other provision of
Section 1401 specifying the amount of the tax credit also
includes explicit reference to an “Exchange established by the
state under [section] 1311.”35 Using the canon that courts
should not read language in a statute as mere surplusage,36 a
judge could credit the consistent inclusion of “established by
the state under section 1311” in Section 1401 to conclude that
the tax credit is available only in states that set up their own
Exchanges.
By contrast, other provisions in Section 1401 that do not
refer to tax credits simply use the term “Exchange,”37
suggesting that the qualifier “established by the State under
section 1311” was meant to distinguish state from federally
established exchanges. Furthermore, Section 1421, which
governs tax subsidies to small businesses that offer
31. See Halbig, 758 F.3d at 412–27 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
32. In fact, Adler and Cannon themselves admit that, “[i]t may be
somewhat surprising that the PPACA contains such a gaping hole in its
regulatory scheme. We were both surprised to discover this feature of the law
and initially characterized it as a ‘glitch.’
Yet our further research
demonstrates that this feature was intentional and purposeful and that the
IRS’s rule has no basis in law.” Adler & Cannon, supra note 24, at 123
(emphasis added).
33. See generally John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from
Purposivists?, 106 COLUM L. REV. 70 (2006); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2006).
34. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(A) (2012).
35. 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012).
36. The canon disfavoring surplusage counsels that “[a] statute should be
construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant . . . .” Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S.
88, 101 (2004) (citation omitted).
37. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(3)(B)(i), (d)(3)(B), (e)(3) (2012).
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contributions to their employees who enroll in a qualified
health plan, uses the term “Exchange” without qualifying
whether such Exchange is established by the state or the
federal government.38 Thus, relying on the canon that different
language in different sections of a statute should be read to
signal that Congress intended that the sections operate
differently, Adler and Cannon argue that this inconsistency
demonstrates that the small business subsidy, but not a
taxpayer credit, was meant to be available in states where with
federally run Exchanges.39 Finally, Section 1321 explicitly
provides that the Secretary shall ensure that federally
established Exchanges meet those requirements imposed on
Exchanges set up by the states,40 but it does not mention the
tax benefits that those Exchanges provide. Relying on the
expressio unius canon,41 one could conclude that the ACA
meant to impose the same requirements on state and federallyrun Exchanges, but not to confer the same benefits on them.
For Adler and Cannon, these Textualist tools render the
statutory meaning clear.42
The Halbig panel majority did not find these provisions
quite as clear as did Adler and Cannon. But the panel used its
own technical reading of the language of the Act to find
problems with the government’s reliance on the use of the
language “such Exchange” in Section 1321. First, the panel
majority admitted that “‘such’ conveys what a federal Exchange
is: the equivalent of the Exchange a state would have
established had it elected to do so.”43 The panel also accepted
that Section 1321’s reference to the Exchange described under
Section 1311, along with the reference of Section 1311 in the
definition of Exchange, was sufficient to render federally
established exchanges to be Exchanges under Section 1311. To
quote the panel’s language:
If we import that definition into the text of section 1321,
the provision directs the Secretary to “establish . . . such
38. 26 U.S.C. § 45R (2012).
39. Adler & Cannon, supra note 24, at 133–42.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c) (2012).
41. The full maxim is, “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” which
means that “to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other,
or of the alternative.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009).
42. Adler & Cannon, supra note 24, at 143–48.
43. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2014) reh’g en banc
granted, judgment vacated, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 4,
2014).
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American Health Benefit Exchange established under [section
1311 of the ACA] within the State.” This suggests not only that
the Secretary is to establish the type of exchange described in
section 1311, but also that when she does so, she acts under
section 1311, even though her authority appears in section
1321. Thus, section 1321 creates equivalence between state and
federal Exchanges in two respects: in terms of what they are
and the statutory authority under which they are established.44
But the panel did not see how the statutory provisions
could allow a federally established Exchange to qualify as one
established by a state.45
The panel’s reasoning, however, essentially ignores the
canons of interpretation on which Adler and Cannon based
their interpretation. Those canons would lead to the same
conclusion with respect to inclusion of the phrase “under
section 1311” as they would with respect to “established by a
state.” Thus, the panel relied instead on a very fine parsing of
complicated language in a manner that would not be obvious to
one simply reading the statute.
The technical Textualist analysis gets even more
complicated when one looks to other provisions of the ACA.
Perhaps the most problematic provision for those who claim
subsidies are not available to a purchaser on a federally created
Exchange is use of the term “qualified individual,” in the
section of the Act titled “Consumer Choice.”46 A provision in
that section reads: “In general The term ‘qualified individual’
means, with respect to an Exchange, an individual who— (i) is
seeking to enroll in a qualified health plan in the individual
market offered through the Exchange; and (ii) resides in the
State that established the Exchange.”47 As the United States
argued in Halbig, if federally created Exchanges are different
from those established by the state, Exchanges in the 36 states
that did not set up their own Exchanges have no qualified
individuals.48 The government read this to mean that there

44. Id. at 399–400.
45. Id. at 400.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 18032 (2012).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(1)(A) (2012).
48. See Brief for Members of Congress and State Legislatures as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (No. 14-5018), 2014 WL 5585306; Halbig, 758 F.3d at 404.
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would be no individuals who could purchase insurance on
federally created Exchanges.49
The Halbig panel majority parried this argument by noting
that, although the Act authorizes qualified individuals to
purchase insurance on their relevant Exchange, nothing in the
Act states that only qualified individuals can purchase
insurance on Exchanges.50 The panel supported its view that
non-qualified individuals can purchase insurance on Exchanges
by noting that the very provision cited by the government to
support its argument makes clear that incarcerated individuals
are excluded from being qualified individuals, but then implies
that such individuals are allowed to enroll in plans purchased
on an Exchange.51 That provision excludes a person from being
a qualified individual if the person is incarcerated “at the time
of enrollment.”52 The panel seemed to ignore the natural
reading of that provision, which recognizes that the phrase, “at
the time of enrollment,” signifies the point in time at which the
Exchange must analyze whether an individual is excluded from
the Exchange because he is incarcerated.53 The panel, however,
might have further supported its reading by referring to the
last sentence in the section which states that an alien who is
not lawfully in the United States “shall not be treated as a
qualified individual and may not be covered under a qualified
health plan in the individual market that is offered through an
Exchange.”54 If only qualified individuals are entitled to be
insured under a plan purchased on an Exchange, then there is
no need for the phrase indicating that such aliens may not be
covered by such a plan. Moreover, this provision stands in
contrast to that involving incarcerated individuals, which does
not explicitly address the coverage of such individuals under a
plan offered on an Exchange.
From a Textualist standpoint, however, the panel’s reading
that non-qualified individuals may be covered by insurance
offered on an Exchange poses a problem because it removes any
significance from the term “qualified individual.” If any
49. Halbig, 758 F.3d at 404.
50. Id. at 404–05.
51. Id. at 405.
52. Id.
53. Adrienne Kendall, Statutory Interpretation and the Affordable Care
Act Tax Credit Debate 22–23 (2015) (unpublished manuscript on file with
author).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(3) (2012).
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individual, whether qualified or not, can purchase insurance on
an Exchange, being a qualified individual makes no difference,
yet the statute uses the term in several provisions.55 Under the
panel’s reading, every one of these provisions would have the
same legal effect if the phrase “qualified individual” were
changed simply to “individual” or dropped from the provision
entirely. In fact, several instances in which the statute uses
the term strongly suggest that only qualified individuals can
purchase insurance on Exchanges.56 Thus, by declining to
impute the word “only” to eligibility of qualified individuals to
purchase insurance on Exchanges, the panel essentially read
the term “qualified individual” out of the statute. Even worse,
the panel’s reading would allow any individual to purchase
insurance on any Exchange, including those outside the state
in which the individual resides, because the only restriction the
ACA places on out of state participation in an Exchange applies
to qualified individuals “with respect to an Exchange.”57
Therefore, in a bizarre twist, the panel’s reading would seem to
allow individuals in states that did not set up their own
exchanges to obtain subsidies by purchasing insurance on an
Exchange in a state that did establish its own Exchange.
B.LEGISLATIVE HISTORY REGARDING THE PREMIUM SUBSIDY
PROVISIONS OF THE ACA
The Textualist paradigm of applying technical tools to find
the objective meaning of statutory text suggests that the IRS
interpretation may be a better reading of statute than that of
Adler and Cannon, and the Halbig panel. But the meaning
55. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-15; 42 U.S.C. § 18931(c)(1)(F). The term
does have significance independent of allowing an individual to purchase
insurance on an Exchange in the part of Section 10103 of the Act that amends
Section 2709 of the Public Health Services Act, which governs participation in
medical clinical trials. But that Section explicitly includes a separate
definition of “qualified individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-8(b).
56. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(c)(F) (2012) (allowing states to merge
individual and small employer Exchanges to serve “qualified individuals and
qualified employers”); 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(2)(A) (2012) (“An Exchange shall
make available qualified health plans to qualified individuals and qualified
employers.”); 42 U.S.C. § 18051(e)(2) (2012) (providing that an individual
eligible for state established basic health program for individuals not eligible
for Medicaid “shall not be treated as a qualified individual under section
18032 eligible for enrollment in a qualified health plan offered through an
Exchange established under section 18031.”).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(1)(A) (2012) (“The term ‘qualified individual’
means, with respect to an Exchange, an individual who . . . (ii) resides in the
State that established the Exchange . . . .”).
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seems to be far from clear. Given the ambiguity of the Act, a
judge might look to legislative history for guidance about
whether Congress intended for purchasers of insurance on
federally established Exchanges to be eligible for premium
subsidies.58 The Halbig panel, which found the text clear, did
not find any legislative history relevant to this specific
interpretative question. Adler and Cannon, however, claim that
the legislative history supports their view of the unavailability
of tax credits in states without state established Exchanges.59
Ultimately, Adler and Cannon are on shaky ground in their
reading of legislative history.
Adler and Cannon contend that Congress intentionally
structured the ACA to deny benefits to taxpayers who enroll in
insurance plans via federally run Exchanges to encourage
states to establish exchanges.60 The only direct evidence they
find of such intent is a paper written by Professor Timothy Jost
and posted to the internet “well before PPACA supporters first
introduced any legislation.”61 This paper shows a general
awareness of the potential for conditioning tax subsidies on
states setting up qualifying exchanges to encourage the states
to do so.62 But, it shows nothing more. The article was not
part of the legislative process and actually proposed conditional
authorization of taxpayer subsidies as an alternative to the
federal government setting up a fallback program of

58. See, e.g., United States v. DiCristina, 726 F.3d 92, 96–97 (2d Cir.
2013) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1281 (2014) (“In the event that the text of a
statute is not clear, a court interpreting the statute may consult the legislative
history to discern ‘the legislative purpose as revealed by the history of the
statute.’” (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers
Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 627 (1993))); James v. Wadas, 724
F.3d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[O]ur task is to determine Congress' intent,
beginning with the plain language of the statute itself . . . . If, however, the
text is ambiguous, we inquire further to discern Congress’ intent looking to the
legislative history and underlying public policy of the statute.” (citations
omitted)); Grant Thornton, LLP v. Office of Comptroller of the Currency, 514
F.3d 1328, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (rejecting use of legislative history because
the statute was ”clear enough”); see also William N. Eskridge Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 (1990) (“[Under] the Court’s
‘traditional’ approach: The plain meaning of a statute governs its
interpretation, unless negated by strongly contradictory legislative history.”).
59. Adler & Cannon, supra note 24, at 148–57.
60. Id. at 142–43.
61. Id. at 143, 153–55 & n.129.
62. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health Insurance Exchanges: Legal Issues, 37
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 53, 56 (2009).
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administering exchanges.63 In fact, Congress clearly chose to
have HHS set up a fallback program. Of course, it is possible
that Congress intended to both set up a fall back program and
use conditional subsidies to encourage states to set up
exchanges, but it is just as possible that it did not.
Adler and Cannon cite three pieces of legislative history
that they argue directly support their interpretation. The first
piece is the version of the health care bill that was passed by
the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP)
Committee.64 The provisions of that bill – the Affordable
Health Choices Act of 2009 – was not the progenitor of the
relevant sections of the ACA. Nonetheless, there is value in
engaging its legislative history to show that it does not support
Adler and Cannon’s conclusion that it evidences congressional
intent to hold states hostage to tax credits in order to
encourage them to establish “Gateways” – the bill’s equivalent
to exchanges. That bill distinguished between a state that
established its own Gateway (an establishing state), one that
asked the federal government to establish a Gateway in the
state (a participating state), and a state that refused to
participate in the setting up of a Gateway in the state.65 The
bill would have denied tax credits to individuals in establishing
states until three conditions were met: (1) the Secretary
determined that the Gateway met the bill’s requirements, (2)
the state had enacted legislation imposing regulations required
by the bill on the state’s individual and small-group health
insurance markets; (3) the state had enacted legislation
making state and local governments subject to the employer
insurance mandate.66 For participating states, the bill denied
tax credits until conditions 2 and 3 were met; for those states
not participating, the bill would have denied tax credits until
condition 3 was met.67
The notion that the tax credits were used to encourage
states to cooperate in implementing the bill’s provisions is
belied by the fact that the greater the state cooperation, the
greater the number of conditions that had to be met before
63. Id. (“Alternatively, [Congress] could . . . [offer] tax subsidies for
insurance only in states that [comply] with federal requirements . . . .”).
64. Adler & Cannon, supra note 24, at 154–56. (discussing the HELP Bill,
Affordable Health Choices Act, S. 1679, 111th Cong. (2009)).
65. Affordable Health Choices Act, S. 1679, 111th Cong. § 3104(a)(1)-(2)
(2009).
66. Id. at §3104(a)-(b).
67. Id. at §3104(a)-(c).
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purchasers on the state’s Gateway could receive the credits.
This suggests that the impetus behind the conditions were to
ensure that the insurance market in the state met the criteria
set out by the bill before subsidies would flow to the state; it did
not matter whether those criteria were met because of federal
or state action. Under the ACA, however, once the federal
government establishes an Exchange in a state, there is
nothing more a state must do to ensure that the insurance
markets meet the Act’s goals. Hence, if anything, the structure
of the tax credit provisions under the Affordable Health
Choices bill suggests that federally created Exchanges would
qualify for tax credits once they meet the criteria for Exchanges
under the Act. This is precisely the same criteria that apply
under the ACA for tax credits on state established Exchanges.
The absence of separate treatment of tax credits for federally
created Exchanges likely simply reflected the lack of need for
separate provisions to govern such tax credits.
The second piece of legislative history that Adler and
Cannon cite as direct support for their reading of the statute is
a colloquy between Senator Max Baucus, chairman of the
Finance Committee, and Senator John Ensign, a republican
from Nevada.68 The Finance Committee’s reported bill, The
Healthy Future Act of 2009, included the relevant language
that became the ACA, so this colloquy is more directly on point
in assessing the final statute.69 The colloquy addressed the
question of how the Finance Committee could have jurisdiction
to impose conditions on how states set up their Exchanges.
Senator Baucus responded that the key was tax credits.70 The
fact that qualified state Exchanges would receive tax credits
meant that the conditions on qualification triggered federal
government spending, giving the Committee jurisdiction. Adler
and Cannon essentially argue that if the federal fallback
program also would entitle taxpayer participants to tax credits,
68. Adler & Cannon, supra note 24, at 155–57 (citing Executive Committee
Meeting to Consider Health Care Reform: Before the S. Comm. on Finance,
111th Cong. 326 (2009)).
69. Adler & Cannon, supra note 24, at 154.
70. Executive Committee Meeting to Consider Health Care Reform: Before
the S. Comm. on Finance, 111th Cong. 326 (2009), available at http://www
.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/download/?id=c6a0c668-37d9-4955-861c50959b0a8392; see also Executive Committee Meeting to Consider an Original
Bill Providing for Health Care Reform: Before the S. Comm. on Finance, CSPAN (starting at 2:53:21) (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.c-spanvideo.org/
program/289085-4.
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then the credits would be universally available and the state
qualifications would not trigger tax credits, thereby denying
the Finance Committee jurisdiction to impose conditions on
states.71
Adler and Cannon, however, seem to have ignored the
option of insurance purchased off any ACA Exchange. If such
insurance does not have to meet conditions imposed on plans
offered through qualified exchanges,72 then it might underprice
plans sold on qualified Exchanges even if the qualified
Exchange is federally established. The tax subsidy may be
crucial to allow plans on qualified Exchanges, whether federal
or state run, to meet the regulations adopted under section
1311(c)(1) and still compete effectively. Most significantly, the
conditions on state Exchanges would still place the legislation
within the Finance Committee’s jurisdiction because those
conditions were not universal, but rather were granted only to
qualified Exchanges (whether established by the state or HHS)
and not to products sold outside of qualified Exchanges. In
particular, the tax subsidies comprise a mechanism to ensure
that plans sold through ACA Exchanges would be able to
compete with plans sold on any competing exchange that would
not have to comply with criteria set out in section 1311 and
regulations under that section
The third potentially relevant piece of legislative history
that Adler and Cannon discuss is a letter that the Texas
Democratic Delegation to the House of Representatives sent to
President Obama, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, and
House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, expressing concern about
the Senate bill as the basis for the ACA.73 The gist of the letter
is that the House Bill, which would have offered a federally run
national health exchange to compete with state run exchanges,
would protect against state recalcitrance in implementing the
Act.74 The letter expressed concerns that under the Senate bill,
Texans would be “shortchange[d]” because the state would set
up “weak, state-based health insurance exchanges.”75 It goes
71. Adler & Cannon, supra note 24, at 157.
72. Those criteria are set out in 42 U.S.C. § 18031(c)(1), but are in
addition to requirements adopted by the Secretary under that subsection.
73. See Adler & Cannon, supra note 24, at n.21, (discussing U.S. Rep.
Doggett: Settling for Second-Rate Health Care Doesn’t Serve Texans, MY
HARLINGEN NEWS (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.myharlingennews.com/p=6426
(reprinting the letter) [hereinafter Doggett Letter]).
74. Doggett Letter, supra note 73.
75. Id.
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on to describe in detail how the state could increase complexity
and reduce purchasers’ market leverage as well as set up
“multiple exchanges,” including only “one or two dominant
insurers.”76 It does opine that under the Senate bill, “millions
of people will be left no better off than before Congress acted,”
but it does so after noting that Texas has experienced difficult
budget years and in response reduced its Medicaid program,
implying that states will similarly weaken their investment in
the exchanges.77 The only mention of subsidies comes in one
sentence near the end of the letter, which merely states that
under the House bill: “A single, national health insurance
exchange will not only administer federal affordability credits
and receive federal start-up funds, but will also be charged
with enforcing federal laws and regulations.”78
What is
significant about the letter is its focus on fears that states
would not adequately fund the operation of qualified Exchanges
or hold them to the requirements of the Act, and its failure to
mention differential availability of tax credits under the Senate
bill.
II. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS FAILURE THEORY OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The analysis of relevant ACA provisions indicates that
Textualist methods of statutory interpretation provide several
countervailing arguments about whether the ACA permits tax
credits for individuals who enroll in plans via federally created
Exchanges. Therefore, reasonable judges could disagree about
the resolution of that question, in which case the IRS should
prevail under step two of Chevron.79 Some judges, however,
subscribe to a more active role at step one of Chevron. For
example, Justice Scalia has stated that he is less likely than
non-textual judges to find a statute to be ambiguous at step one
of Chevron.80 Essentially, if Scalia is fairly confident that he
has found a best objective meaning, then he will find the
statute unambiguous even if reasonable judges could disagree.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Under Chevron, reviewing courts first determine whether Congress
has spoken to the precise question the agency has addressed, and if not, they
are to defer to the agency interpretation if reasonable. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
80. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521 (1989).
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The legislative process failure theory of statutory
interpretation, however, counsels that the tax credit provision
of the ACA should be interpreted in light of the strong
contextual
evidence
of
legislators’
likely
subjective
understanding of the tax credit provisions, even by a judge who
otherwise would use technical interpretive tools. This Essay
advocates that the question of whether individuals who
purchase insurance on federally created exchanges are eligible
for tax credits should be interpreted using a recently proposed
method of reading statutes – the “‘legislative process failure’
theory of statutory interpretation.” 81 Under this theory, courts
should not rely on traditional judicial methods of interpreting
statutory provisions, especially technical application of
Textualist tools of interpretation, when those methods lead to a
“best meaning” that likely was not the meaning that most
legislators ascribed to the provision.82 In such instances, courts
should pay more attention to contextual clues to legislators’
likely understanding of the statutory provision, including
legislative history. With respect to tax credits for purchasers on
federally created exchanges, this Essay concludes that the fact
that virtually no one seemed to be aware, when the ACA was
passed, that it could be read to preclude such subsidies strongly
supports reading the statute to authorize them.
A. JUDICIAL VERSUS LEGISLATIVE INTERPRETIVE METHODS
The legislative process failure theory of statutory
interpretation is predicated on the observation that the courts
and Congress comprise different interpretive communities that
use different methods for attaching meaning to statutes.83 Our
constitutional system assigns the fundamental role of making
law to the legislature. Hence, any interpretive method that
undermines legislative supremacy in determining the meaning
of statutes is constitutionally troubling.84 Legislative
81. See Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 467.
82. Id. at 494–95.
83. Id. at 529.
84. See Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative
State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory
Interpretation, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 1239, 1251 (2002) (“The legitimacy of judicial
power over statutory interpretation has long been thought to flow from this
assumption that judges would implement Congress’s decisions.”); John F.
Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 24–
25 (2001) (proposing that the proper role for judges interpreting statutes is as
faithful agents of the legislature); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation
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supremacy does not mandate that courts acquiesce in the
legislative method for determining statutory meaning in every,
or perhaps even many, cases. It does require, however, that the
two branches coordinate their means of interpreting statutes to
make their two distinct methods for determining meaning
compatible.
Judges usually begin interpreting a statute by reading its
text, and forming some notion of the most likely meaning, or
perhaps rough probabilities that the words take on any of
several possible meanings. Judges then look seriatim to other
indications of statutory meaning. 85 These include semantic
canons of interpretation, which describe some generalizable
norms about how language ordinarily is used. They also
include inquiries into the structure of statutes — for example
how the precise wording fits within wording of other sections,
or even other statutes, looking for telling similarities and
differences from terms whose meanings are well accepted.
Judges will also look to policy canons, which affect how the
courts read statutes in order to effectuate underlying
assumptions about how our legal system should operate. If
these tools do not reveal a best objective meaning of the
statutory language, judges might look at more contextual clues
to find the best meaning of the language enacted into law.
Textualists will stop there, while purposivist judges are willing
to consult legislative history to determine a meaning that
members of Congress likely gave to the statutory provision at
issue.86 But even judges willing to consider legislative intent
rarely use intent or general purpose revealed in legislative
history to override what they deem to be clear textual meaning
derived by application of technical tools of interpretation.87
and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 284 (1989) (“Legislative
supremacy, as a doctrine of statutory interpretation, is grounded in the notion
that . . . courts are subordinate to legislatures.”).
85. Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 495–96 (describing judicial methods of
statutory interpretation as exercises in Bayesian probability updating).
86. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 37 (2006) (“[T]extualist scholars often criticize purposivists for
employing context in order to adjust or even contradict a statute’s clear
textual meaning”); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 2388, 2434 n.179 (2003) (“[T]he modern textualists’ concerns come into
play only when courts use background statutory purpose to contradict or vary
the clear meaning of a specific statutory provision.”).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 727 F.3d 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2013)
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1278 (2014) (“’[W]hen the statute's language is plain,
the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the

SEIDENFELD_1fmt

2015]

2/24/2015 2:17 PM

TAX CREDITS

119

The important point is that judges approach interpretation by a
comprehensive and coherent process that depends on
specialized tools to update their assessment of the likelihood
that the words have particular meaning.
Members of Congress do not rely primarily on judicial
methods of interpretation. When enacting legislation, those
legislators with an interest in the bill and an institutional role
in helping draft it negotiate a bargain with others who have an
interest in the legislation.88 After a bargain is reached,
legislators communicate that bargain to staff members who are
tasked with drafting language to implement it.89
After
language is initially drafted, it is distributed to representatives
of various affected interest groups — which may include groups
representing private entities subject to the statute’s provisions,
groups of individuals who are meant to be protected by the
statute, administrative agencies, and members of White House
staff.90 These representatives then look closely at the language
and try to ensure that it will not affect them in ways that differ
from the original legislative bargain. This process of interest
group vetting of bills is likely to catch many potential problems
stemming from how the bills are worded.91 Once those
problems are brought to congressional staff’s attention, the
language can be changed to better reflect the bargain to which
the negotiating legislators agreed. Moreover, congressional
staff members who draft the legislation take judicial tools of
interpretation into account when reducing the bargain to
statutory language.92 Thus, with respect to any particular
test is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.’”) (quoting Lamie v.
U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534, (2004)); United States v. Desposito, 704 F.3d
221, 226 (2d Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2402 (2013) (“In construing a
statute, we begin with the plain language, giving all undefined terms their
ordinary meaning.”); Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp., 699 F.3d 129, 134 (1st
Cir. 2012) (“We assume that the ordinary meaning of the statutory language
expresses the legislature's intent. . . .”).
88. See Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 496–97.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 497.
91. Id. at 497–98
92. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation
from the Inside--An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation,
and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 928–30 (2013) (noting that
although congressional staff members are not aware of many semantic canons
by name, their consideration of the meaning of statutory language is
consistent with most such canons); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The
Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
575, 603 (2002) (reporting that attorneys in the Office of Legislative Counsel
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interpretive
question,
the
probability
that
judicial
interpretation leads to a reading contrary to legislators’
understanding of what they enacted is not great. But, the
legislative process for determining statutory meaning during
the drafting process never performs a step-by-step
comprehensive judicial-type interpretative analysis on all, or
even most, of the statutory provisions that Congress includes in
a statute.93 Therefore, situations will arise when the legislative
process will not catch language that judicial methods of
interpretation is likely to interpret contrary to the
understanding of most legislators. When the interpretive
mechanisms of the legislative and judicial communities produce
different statutory meaning, the situation can be characterized
as legislative process failure.
B. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS FAILURE AND THE NEED TO
COORDINATE JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE INTERPRETIVE
METHODS
The legislative process failure theory of statutory
interpretation asks how the legal system should address such
failure. If Congress is the branch that gets to make the law,
the law must comport with the intent of those who voted for it.
As Joseph Raz reasoned: “It makes no sense to give any person
or body law-making power unless it is assumed that the law
they make is the law they intended to make.”94 Therefore,
legislative supremacy requires that the judiciary and Congress
come to some accommodation to ensure that courts interpret
statutes in accord with legislators’ understanding. But, as John
Manning has noted, such intent can be objective: the requisite
legislative intent exists if “legislators intend to enact a law that
will be decoded according to prevailing interpretive
conventions.”95 In other words, legislative law-making
supremacy is satisfied as long as Congress knows how courts
felt that they had internalized the canons of interpretation).
93. “While staffers [of the Senate Judiciary Committee] are well aware of
the general principles of statutory interpretation and do have in mind
generally how a court would interpret language they are writing, in the
ordinary course of drafting they do not spend substantial time anticipating or
attempting to research the judicial application of particular interpretive law to
the bill being drafted.” Nourse & Schacter, supra note 92, at 600.
94. Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW:
ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 258 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
95. John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV.
419, 432–33 (2005).
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will interpret statutes and can adjust its process to ensure that
statutes will be interpreted as it intends.96 But, there are
reasons why the legislature cannot generally be expected to
acquiesce in the judicial method of decoding statutory meaning.
Essentially, the difference between congressional and
judicial interpretive conventions raises the question in any
particular case: which institution should accommodate the
other’s decoding convention?97
For the legislature to
accommodate judicial interpretive methodology would obligate
it to perform a judicial type analysis for every potentially
problematic statutory provision. By doing so, Congress can
check that the words it enacts, when interpreted by courts in
particular cases, will implement the bargain it has struck. If
Congress finds that the words of a bill fail to implement the
bargain, it can change them. For the courts to accommodate the
legislative methodology would require that courts give credence
to context that reveals the most likely understanding of the
legislators who voted for the statute. Which branch should
accommodate the other should depend on the costs of each
accommodation.
Textualists emphasize that there are costs of considering
evidence of subjective intent that can be manipulated. For
example, individuals involved in the drafting process may be
able to salt legislative history with clues to support meaning
inconsistent with the statute’s underlying legislative bargain.98
In addition, Textualists claim that a consistent set of rules tied
to use of language constrain judicial interpretive discretion,
and thereby reduce judges’ ability to read statutes to further
their personal policy preferences.99 To the extent that context
may be more difficult to read than text, it may allow judges to
pick the meaning that they ideologically prefer. In many
instances, however, rules about how to use context, including
96. See Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 500.
97. Id. at 501.
98. See John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV.
1287, 1311–18 (2010) (detailing objections to use of broad statutory purpose as
effectively overriding legislative bargains that are reflected in statutory text);
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes:
Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295,
1305 (1990) (describing the textualist critique that crediting legislative history
when interpreting statutes lowers the costs of special interest rent-seeking in
the legislative process).
99. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in
Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 62, 65 (1988); see also
Molot, Rise and Fall, supra note 86, at 9.

SEIDENFELD_1fmt

122

2/24/2015 2:17 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:pppp

legislative history, may be sufficiently constraining, and such
use may provide sufficiently clear evidence of a likely
legislative consensus, that the relative costs of contextual
inquiry into subjective understanding will not be great.100
On the other side of the ledger is the burden imposed on
the legislature of having to resort to judicial type analysis of all
statutory provisions of questionable meaning. Imposing this
burden on Congress essentially mandates procedures for
statutory enactment beyond those required by the Constitution
that can greatly interfere with the legislature’s law-making
function.101 In any particular case, it often takes some of the
brightest legal minds many hours to apply judicial tools of
construction to determine an objective best reading of a statute.
And the court does so only in response to a legal complaint,
which essentially signals a potentially problematic statutory
provision for which the legislative and judicial interpretive
approaches might lead to different meanings and focuses
inquiry on a discrete interpretive question. Congress, however,
must attach meaning at the time it enacts a statute; it cannot
take advantage of the experience from application of the
statute and a legal complaint to signal potential legislative
process failures. But, without signals from those subject to the
statute, Congress would have to perform a judicial-type
analysis with respect to any term of the statute that potentially
might lead to a difference between legislative and judicial
understandings.102 Essentially, requiring Congress generally
to accommodate judicial-type decoding would place such a great
burden on the legislative process that it would almost certainly
shut that process down.103
100. Many scholars reject the claim that Textualism is more constraining
of judges than intent-based interpretation. See Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting
the Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture in Honor of Irving
Younger, 84 MINN. L. REV. 199, 206–07 (1999) (questioning whether
textualism has increased predictability and certainty of statutory
interpretation); Robert G. Vaughn, A Comparative Analysis of the Influence of
Legislative History on Judicial Decision-Making and Legislation, 7 IND. INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 1, 39–41 (1996) (concluding after analysis of several British
cases that relying on legislative history to help identify statutory purpose can
constrain judicial discretion).
101. Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 503
102. Staff members from Office of Legislative Counsel, which is supposed
to ensure that statutes implement the deals struck by the legislators, report
that they do not have the time to perform “top-to-bottom review complete with
comprehensive interpretive analysis of every bill the office helps to draft.”
Nourse & Schacter, supra note 92, at 604.
103. See Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 504; see also, Nourse & Schacter,
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Balancing the error costs from reliance on contextual clues
against the pragmatic costs of the legislature having to perform
judicial analysis on all statutory provisions therefore strongly
suggests that the courts should accommodate the nonsequential legislative process when the legislature is unaware
that courts would likely interpret the language differently than
legislators understood it.104 The balance changes, however,
when legislators have a clear signal that particular statutory
text might not accurately reflect legislators’ understanding.
First, once the legislature identifies a problematic statutory
provision the cost of legislative correction is, at most,
comparable to that of the judiciary. 105 Attorneys in Legislative
Counsel’s Office can analyze the problematic provision just as a
judge would to determine meaning, identify what might create
the unintended meaning, and add language to clarify the
meaning. Often, armed with this identification, Congress need
not perform a judicial analysis at all; it need only add clarifying
language – the kind of language that often gets inserted in
legislative history. Although such drafting is not a trivial task,
it becomes manageable once one identifies the precise bargain
being struck and focuses on the particular provision meant to
incorporate that bargain. Second, the costs of manipulation of
contextual evidence increases when the legislature is aware of
a process failure. Declining to change the language of a bill in
the face of known process failure indicates a strong probability
that the bill sponsors could not get the change passed using the
Constitution’s specified procedures for enacting legislation.106
The legislative process theory of statutory interpretation
thus counsels that when the legislature is unaware of the
potential for courts to interpret a statutory provision contrary
to the bargain the legislature meant to strike, the courts should
look for contextual indications of subjective legislative intent to
guide them in determining the meaning that legislators likely
ascribed to the language of the provision. When, however, the
legislature is aware that a provision poses a likely legislative
process failure, the courts should engage in judicial type
inquiry into the objective meaning of the provision.
supra note 92, at 619–20 (“[T]he sheer diversity of approaches to the drafting
process, the multiplicity of drafters, and the different points in time at which
text is drafted suggest the limited disciplinary effect of judicial rulings.”).
104. Seidenfeld, supra note 17, at 507–08.
105. Id. at 507.
106. Id. at 507–08.
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III. LEGISLATIVE PROCESS FAILURE THEORY APPLIED
TO TAX CREDITS ON FEDERALLY CREATED EXCHANGES
Before turning to contextual evidence of legislators’
understanding of the eligibility of federally created Exchanges
for tax credits, one must answer two questions. First, what is
the evidence of process failure – that is, that members of
Congress likely understood the Act to authorize tax credits for
buyers in a federally established Exchange, even if a Textualist
analysis of the language might lead to the opposite conclusion?
Second, what would explain Congress’s failure to see the
potential inconsistency between that understanding and a
reading using a Textualist technical analysis that might lead to
the opposite conclusion?
On the first question, one important bit of evidence is that
a first-blush reading of the statute would support that
understanding. Section 1321 seems to say that federally
created Exchanges substitute for state established ones in all
respects. To undermine that as the best reading of the statute,
one has to note that section 1401 used the term “Exchange
established by a state under section 1311,” instead of simply
refer to an Exchange, in the two provisions addressing
premium tax credits.107 But, that happenstance alone does not
indicate with any clarity that the phrase “established by a
state” was meant to be significant rather than reflecting a
simple inadvertent inclusion of language unrelated to the
legislative bargain about premium tax credits. To gain
confidence that the phrase was meant to be significant, one
would next have to verify that provisions of section 1401 that
did not address tax credits did not include “established by a
state’ as a modifier of Exchange. Further, one would have to
look at all the times outside of section 1401 that the statute
used the phrase “established by the state” to see whether they
too could be explained by some rational distinction between
state and federal exchanges.108 Such an inquiry is fraught with
107. See supra notes 20, 35, 37 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, The Test to Textualism in King v.
Burwell: A Reply to Abbe Gluck, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/11/12/the-test-totextualism-in-king-v-burwell-a-reply-to-abbe-gluck/ (relying on consideration
of every use of the term “established by the State” and reporting that each
“serve[s] to facilitate coordination between state exchanges and other
programs or to provide incentives for state action”); see also Amy E. Sanders,
Note, A Gap in the Affordable Care Act: Will Tax Credits Be Available for
Insurance Purchased Through Federal Exchanges, 66 VAND. L REV. 1259,
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the need to think creatively about all the possible reasons one
might want to distinguish between these types of exchanges.
For example, in response to the government’s argument that it
makes no sense to limit a state’s abilities to modify eligibility
for its Medicaid programs forever if a state decided not to
establish an Exchange, the Halbig panel majority came up with
the response that such a limitation might make sense if the
Exchange in the state was created by the federal government to
make up for the fact that, under the panel’s reading,
individuals in that state would not be able to obtain premium
tax credits109 –an argument that seems a bit speculative in
light of the fact that such tax credits were an important part of
making health care affordable to many more people than those
who might currently be receiving Medicaid benefits. Moreover,
this technical inquiry to overcome the understanding that most
likely would follow from a casual reading would have had to be
made over the entirety of one of the most long and complex
statutes in the history of congressional enactments.110 One
cannot reasonably expect members of Congress to perform such
inquiries on an issue that, at the time of enactment, was not
even on anyone’s radar screen.
In addition, it seems odd that Congress would bury such an
important distinction between Exchanges created by the
federal and state governments in a technical provision that
describes how to calculate the tax credit. And it seems odder
still that it would do so in a manner that would require a
complex analysis of the entire statute to conclude that such
credits were available only on state established Exchanges. The
Supreme Court has stated, in a different context, that Congress
does not “hide elephants in mouseholes.”111 If so, Congress
would not resolve a major issue that drives an entire statute
using subtle semantic signals in a section of the Act that
specifies the details of calculating a tax credit. Yet it is
precisely in such semantic technicalities that the Halbig panel
1287–88 (2013) (identifying references to section 1311 that do not make sense
unless applied to federal Exchanges established under section 1321).
109. See Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 405–06 (D.C. Cir. 2014) reh’g en
banc granted, judgment vacated, No. 14-5018, 2014 WL 4627181 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 4, 2014).
110. The Act runs 906 pages in the Statutes at Large, not including the
subsequent amendments enacted nominally as part of the budget
reconciliation process. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L.
111-148, 124 Stat. 119-1024 (2010).
111. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
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majority locates its inquiry into whether premium subsidies are
available on federal created Exchanges.112
On the second question, there are good reasons to believe
that Congress was unaware of the potential question regarding
tax credits on federally created Exchanges. The Senate bill was
drafted with the expectation that it would be merged with the
“Affordable Care for America Act” that had passed the House,
and which would have established a national insurance
exchange from which states could opt out.113 But Scott Brown’s
election to the Senate assured a filibuster of any change to the
Senate bill that might be made by a Conference Committee
other than some modifications that could be squeezed into the
budget reconciliation process.114 This reality essentially forced
the Democrats to enact the Senate Bill as the ACA, with no
opportunity to clean up any sloppy drafting. Hence the Senate
bill was not vetted as carefully as it might have been had those
involved in its drafting expected it to become the law.
The fact that the legislative history is totally silent on this
precise question also supports the inference that Congress was
unaware that the language of section 1401 was problematic.
For example, the letter from the Texas Congressional
Delegation, which Adler and Cannon see as evidence that
Congress intended to restrict premium tax credits to state
established exchanges,115 is best viewed as circumstantial
evidence that the representatives did not envision that
participation in federally run Exchanges would disqualify
taxpayers from obtaining tax credits. Its detailed and
comprehensive diatribe outlining the disadvantages of the
Senate bill never mentions the loss of tax credits under
federally run Exchanges as such a disadvantage.
Given the answers to these two preliminary questions, the
legislative process theory of statutory interpretation counsels
112. See Halbig, 758 F.3d at 399–402.
113. See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. §
301 et seq. (as passed by House of Representatives, Nov. 7, 2009), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/C?c111:./temp/~c111iF4Up3.
114. See Janet L. Dolgin & Katherine R. Dieterich, Social and Legal Debate
About the Affordable Care Act, 80 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 45, 51 (2011); Jonathan
Cohn, How to Pass the Bill--Whatever Happens Tuesday, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan.
17, 2010), http://www.newrepublic.com/blog/the-treatment/what-do-if-coakley
-loses-contd; see also Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (amending the ACA, which had
been based on the Senate Bill, in ways that escaped a filibuster because they
could be construed as budget reconciliation).
115. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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reliance on contextual evidence of the subjective meaning that
legislators most probably ascribed to the ACA with respect to
tax credits for federally created Exchanges. As noted in the
discussion of legislative history above,116 that history fails to
discuss this precise issue at all, but it nonetheless illuminates
the likely understanding of legislators on that issue. The
general discussion of federally created Exchanges in the
legislative history assumes that those Exchanges will
substitute for one created by the state when the state fails or
refuses to create an Exchange.117 In addition, this assumption
is also reflected in both scholarly and media accounts of how
the ACA would operate.118 Thus, the best evidence from the
116. See supra notes 107–16 and accompanying text.
117. The legislative history does not reveal that much attention was paid to
the federally created Exchange fallback, perhaps because most members of
Congress expected states to establish their own Exchanges. See, e.g., 155
Cong. Rec. 33,004 (2009) (statement of Sen. Mary Landrieu) (“[T]here is no
government-run public option in this bill. Instead, we reached an agreement to
provide private health insurance plans to be sold nationwide. . . . Importantly,
we ensured that at least one nonprofit plan will be offered in every State
exchange and that the States cannot opt out at the whim of every Governor
and legislature.”). Nonetheless, the few references to federally created
exchanges manifest a general understanding that these exchanges would
simply step into the shoes of those that otherwise would be established by the
state. See, e.g., 155 Cong. Rec. 32,996 (2009) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch)
(“[T]he legislation orders states to establish health benefit exchanges which
will require states to pass legislation and regulations. If they do not, or even if
the Secretary of Health and Human Services believes they will not by a
certain date, the Secretary will literally step into each state and establish and
operate this exchange for [the states].”) (emphasis added); 155 Cong. Rec.
S13832 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2009) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus) (“[O]ur bill
fundamentally gives States the choice to participate in the exchanges
themselves, or if they do not choose to do so, to allow the Federal Government
to set up the exchanges . . . .”); S. Rep. No. 111-89, at 18–19 (2009) (“By no
later than July 1, 2013, a state would be required to establish and have in
operation one or more exchanges . . . that meet the requirements regarding the
offer of QHBPs. If states do not establish these exchanges within 2 years of
enactment (or if the Secretary determines the exchanges will not be
operational by July 1, 2013), the Secretary would be required to contract with
a nongovernmental entity to establish the exchanges within the state. States
would be required to establish interim exchanges for use by state residents as
soon as practicable in the period from January 1, 2010 to June 30, 2013. If
these interim exchanges are not operational within a reasonable period after
enactment, the Secretary would be required to contract with a
nongovernmental entity to establish state exchanges during this interim
period.”) (emphasis added).
118. See, e.g., Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value
of State-Based Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111,
144–150 (2011) (“[R]esponsibility for the Exchanges is assigned first to states,
with the federal government as a backstop, should states fail to comply.”);
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legislative history and popular discussion of federally created
exchanges is “the dog that didn’t bark”:119 none of the few
discussions about the relative advantages of a state
establishing its own qualified Exchange versus letting HHS do
so, whether in legislative history or in the media, mentioned
differential availability of tax credits Yet, this issue threatens
to undermine entirely the operation of the ACA. Silence on this
issue makes sense only as evidence that members of Congress
did not understand section 1401 to operate as Adler and
Cannon or the Halbig panel majority have argued.
In addition to the significance of Congressional and media
silence about the precise issue, another contextual indication
that Congress understood section 1401 to operate as the IRS
Henry Aaron, State Needs Action On Health Reform: Don't Accept One-SizeFits-All
Approach
on
Exchanges,
STAR
TRIBUNE,
http://www.startribune.com/opinion/editorials/111293694.html (last updated
Dec. 5, 2010) (stating that federal dollars that the state would forego by not
promptly establishing an exchange, but not mentioning lost subsidies as such
costs); Robert Pear, Health Care Overhaul Depends on State’s Insurance
Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010 at 23N (“Federal officials . . . will run
the exchange in any state that is unwilling or unable to do so.”); Carrie
Teegardin, A New Way to Insure Public, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 26, 2010,
at A1 (“Officials in every state can design and run their own exchange, or
simply punt the task to Washington.”). There is also some evidence, prior to
the subsidy issue being raised in the IRS rulemaking, of a general expectation
that subsidies would be available on federally established exchanges. For
example, “neither the Congressional Budget Office score nor the Joint
Committee on Taxation technical explanation of the Affordable Care Act
discusse[d] excluding those enrolled through a Federally-facilitated exchange.”
Letter from Douglas H. Shulman, Comm'r, Internal Revenue Serv., to David
Phil Roe, Representative, U.S. House of Representatives (Nov. 29, 2011),
available
at
http://roe.house.gov/uploadedfiles/irs_response_to_letter_on_
ppaca_ exchange.pdf; see also Pear, supra (noting that “federal subsidies, to
help pay for insurance, will be available only to people who enroll in health
plans through an exchange,” and later stating that the federal government
“will run the exchange in any state that is unable or unwilling to do so”); Doug
Trapp, California First to OK Insurance Exchange Outlined Under Health
System Reform, AM. MED. NEWS (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.amednews
.com/article/20101018/government/310189955/1/ (“People earning between
133% and 400% of [the federal poverty level] will be eligible for private
coverage subsidized on a sliding scale. . . . If states do not create an insurance
exchange, the federal government will offer one in the state.”). But see, James
Coburn, Commission Wades Through New Health Regulations, EDMOND SUN
(Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.edmondsun.com/news/local_news/commission
-wades-through-new-health-regulations/article_dde2cf27-b941-54fe-8b3c
-03dfac99413c.html (“There is no obligation for states to be in the health
insurance exchange. . . . But none of the incentives or subsidies being offered
are applicable without the exchange.”).
119. Cf. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in THE MEMOIRS OF
SHERLOCK HOLMES 22 (1894), available at https://books.google.com/.
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interpreted it is the lack of any plausible story about why
Congress would limit subsidies to state created Exchanges. As
Adler and Cannon suggest, the only reason for denying tax
credits to purchasers on federally created Exchanges would be
to encourage states to establish Exchanges.120 Essentially, one
could read section 1401 as creating a cudgel with which the
federal government could threaten states, thereby inducing
them to establish Exchanges. But, the ability to get one’s way
by carrying a big stick depends on others knowing that one
wields it.121 Hence, while an intent to encourage states to
establish exchanges might make sense in the abstract, it is
belied by Congress’s failure to make the existence of this cudgel
known. 122
CONCLUSION
What one makes of the contextual analysis this Essay
provides drives the story one will derive from that analysis.
One might conclude that the statutory provisions are too
consistent to be the result of pure coincidence. Even so, the lack
of any direct discussion of the different tax credit treatment of
federally run Exchanges makes it highly unlikely that those
who voted for the bill understood it to mandate denial of such
credits. Two more likely scenarios are: that the sections were
drafted by different groups of congressional staff members who
failed to coordinate what they were doing – essentially that
drafters of section 1401 believed that section 1321 would clarify
that federally run Exchanges stand in for state run ones in
120. Adler and Cannon report that initially they thought the wording of
section 1401’s tax credit provisions was inadvertent. Adler & Cannon, supra
note 24, at 123. They claim to have found subsequently that restricting
subsidies was meant to encourage states to establish their own exchanges. Id.
at 151–54. No other possible rational for the distinction between credits on
federally and state created Exchanges has been suggested.
121. Thus, President Theodore Roosevelt, who popularized the expression
“speak softly but carry a big stick,” made sure to send the United States Navy
around the world so that others knew of the United States’ military
capabilities. See Mike McKinley, The Cruise of the Great White Fleet, NAVY
HIST. HERITAGE COMMAND (Dec. 18, 2014, 7:13 AM), http://www.history.navy
.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/c/cruisegreat-white-fleet-mckinley.html.
122. This is in stark contrast to the Act’s attempts to get states to expand
Medicaid. In trying to induce states to adopt such an expansion, the statute
explicitly expanded obligations of states under the existing Medicaid program,
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012), and the existing program clearly
provided that states could lose all Federal contributions to Medicaid for failing
to meet those obligations. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012).
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every respect while drafters of section 1321 believed that
section 1401 would directly indicate inclusion of federally run
Exchanges;123 alternatively, that those who actually chose the
language of the Senate bill meant to exclude tax credits for
purchasers on federally run exchanges, but did not want to
reveal this intent for fear that the full Senate would not accept
it. As recent studies demonstrate, it may be easier for
legislative staff and interest groups to hide their own agendas
in the text of a complex bill than to hide it in legislative
history.124 In either case, the story told by contextual analysis
leads to rejection of a technical reading of the ACA that would
deny tax credits to purchasers on federally run exchanges.

123. Cf. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 92, at 954 (reporting that
congressional staffers are well aware of the canons of consistent usage of
terms within a statute and reading statutes to avoid superfluities, but reject
such canons as unreliable because they do not reflect the fragmented nature of
how statutory text is drafted).
124. See id. at 967–68 (“[S]taffers who draft legislative history may be tied
more closely to elected members than the staffers who draft statutory text.”);
Nourse & Schacter, supra note 92, at 585 (statutory text is principally drafted
by congressional staff).

